What Does Escalation in Aleppo Mean?

The Escalation in Aleppo and the Ambiguity of the March 10 Accord
Yesterday a military clashes broke out in Aleppo, the second largest city and commercial hub of Syria. The official belligerents are the Syrian central government and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria commonly known as the Rojava administration. The fighting is concentrated in the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods. These districts are unique because both their military and civil administrations are tied to Rojava and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Although they are predominantly Kurdish, they also host significant non-Muslim, Armenian and Assyrian, minority populations. Kurdish military presence in Ashrafiyah and Sheikh Maqsoud is actually far from being a threat to Syrian government.

In fact, Kurdish Rojava administration has withdrawn its military forces as a goodwill gesture as per the March 10th Accord signed with Damascus. The both neighbourhoods are being  protected by the popular self-defense forces consisting of locals. Having a closer look on the March 10 Accord; it offers neither a concrete solution nor a clear path on the integration of Rojava into the Syrian army. On the contrary, the Accord is overly broad and ambiguous. Furthermore, Turkish officials are making maximalist and unrealistic demands, such as the full disarmament of SDF and their 'individual integration' into the Syrian army rather than maintaining their structure as a unit. It does worth to remember that Syrian Army itself is not integrated but it consists elements of Ikhvan Affiliated groups, former Al-Qaeda and ISIS leftovers and non-Syrian fighters.

The Damascus Visit and the Aleppo Clashes

To understand the timeline: precisely as the Turkish Foreign Minister and the head of national intelligence were visiting Damascus, Syrian government affiliated militias launched an attack on Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh with heavy weaponry, claiming that "Kurdish forces attacked first." In a rather convenient coincidence, these militias were seen posing with tanks and artillery just minutes after the allegations surfaced. Another striking point in the Aleppo clashes is the rumours of 'Arab Tribal Forces' mobilizing against the SDF.

We first heard of these tribal forces during the Sweida attacks in July 2025, with social media accounts claiming a force of 150,000 armed tribesmen. However, it is now widely understood that the 'Tribal Forces' label is essentially a cover name used by the SNA (Syrian National Army) to camouflage itself. In reality, these groups act as a major proxy force for Turkey on the ground, and it appears we will be hearing their name much more frequently in the future.

This escalation coincided not only with the high-level Turkish delegation’s visit to Damascus but also with a period of intensified rhetoric within Turkey against the Rojava administration. Anyone studies on Turkish affairs would know that fundamental rule: Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy are inextricably linked. And domestic policy mostly run the foreign policy. So to decode the what is going on in Aleppo, we must look at Turkey’s current political climate. In recent weeks, the Foreign Minister has been under fire from Kurdish politicians.

It is not just the pro-Kurdish DEM Party; even Kurdish politicians within the ruling AKP have accused the Minister of throwing the "second Peace Process” that reportedly began in early 2025, under the bus. The Minister is also well-known for his hawkish stance on Rojava and Syria.

Furthermore, a journalist close to the government claimed last week that "the Peace Process did not yield enough public support, and the government wants to pull the plug." While we cannot verify this, the Peace Process has undeniably bolstered the prestige of Abdullah Öcalan the Kurdish leader labeled a terrorist for decades suddenly making him one of Turkey's most influential political figures again. Seen through this lens, such claims become increasingly intriguing.

The Israel Factor and the Quest for Legitimacy

In terms of foreign policy, Turkey’s deep-seated anxiety regarding a potential partnership between the Rojava administration and Israel is clear. Turkish officials do not mince their words on this subject, though their language is often aggressive and far from diplomatic a tone clearly aimed at a domestic audience.The fact that the Aleppo clashes broke out during the Turkish delegation’s visit to Damascus is too significant to be dismissed as a mere coincidence. However, there is a crucial nuance: while those leading the attacks are officially linked to Jolani (HTS), they are, in practice, part of the Syrian National Army (SNA), which is directly beholden to Turkey. This suggests that Turkey is playing a double game: using its proxies to threaten Kurdish forces while timing the attacks to coincide with the Damascus visit. This allows Ankara to shift the blame for any international blowback onto Jolani and his Al-Qaeda-linked roots.

But what does Turkey gain by scapegoating Jolani? Aren't they allies? On paper, yes; but the reality on the ground suggest the relationship is not as rosy as it seems. It is worth remembering Turkey’s strategic partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood; the SNA is largely composed of Turkey-backed individuals close to the Ikhwan ideology, whereas Jolani does not come from this movement. Therefore, framing the negative aspects of a military operation through Jolani serves as a tool for Turkey to keep him in check.

Regarding the "Israel factor," Turkey’s concerns about a Rojava-Israel axis are well-known. Interestingly, Jolani’s administration has openly engaged with both the Jewish diaspora and Israel since taking office. In fact, Turkey seems, ironically, encouraging Jolani to develop relations with Israel. There were even reports that Syria is potentially joining the Abraham Accords. However, currently, the Golan Heights and much of southern Syria are under de facto Israeli control, alongside an Israeli-backed Druze autonomous region. Yet, there is no any official condemnation from neither Jolani government nor Turkey.

Shifting Rhetoric and Possibility of Military Intervention

Then, why is the focus solely on the Kurds’ relationship with Israel? The answer lies in Turkey’s half-century-old Kurdish Question. Ankara’s concern is not just Israeli support; it’s the prospect of Kurds gaining international legitimacy through such relations. Reading between the lines of the aggressive rhetoric, a shift is visible: unlike previous years, Turkey is no longer calling for the total destruction of the Rojava administration. Instead, they are pushing for its "integration into the Syrian army” and “fully implementation” of March 10th Accord.

On the other hand, the March 10 Accord offers neither a concrete solution nor a clear path for the integration of Rojava into the Syrian army. On the contrary, the Accord is filled with overly broad and ambiguous language. At the same time, Turkish officials are making maximalist and unrealistic demands, such as the full disarmament of Rojava’s armed forces and their 'individual  integration' into the Syrian army rather than maintaining their structure as a unit.


Finally, the million-dollar question: Will Turkey launch a full-scale military intervention against Rojava? The answer is likely no. The primary domestic reason is the economy. For a Turkey mired in a deep economic crisis, such a massive operation would be an unbearable financial burden. Furthermore, there is a Peace Process officially underway, though we must add the caveat that these processes are notoriously fragile and can be scrapped the moment the government feels they are no longer "politically profitable.” From a foreign policy perspective, the red lines are even sharper. A major operation is impossible without a green light from the U.S. It is well known that the Trump administration has no appetite for more wars. It seems highly unlikely that Washington would sell its most loyal ally on the ground the Kurds down the river to authorize a Turkish military offensive.