Soviet Union’s Experience and Protests in Iran

International community’s attention is focused on Israel’s recognizing of Somaliland, the US’s operation in Venezuela and The Saudi Arabia versus the UAE skirmish in Yemen. In the meanwhile a major development inside Iran is taking place; the first popular protest of 2026. Iranian economy which is already weak under the international sanctions faced a dramatic record low of its currency against the US dollars last in Sunday, January 4th. The protests have erupted across the country following that economic shock.

Public protests and demonstrations are not unusual in Iran. People of Iran often revolt and protest the regime because of imposing Islamic rules, bad economic conditions, corruption or political repression. However, this protest wave stands apart and for three reasons.

The Bazaar Factor: When Elites Are Affected

Aftermath of the record low, protesters took to the streets, burned regime symbols and posters of Qasem Soleimani and chanted slogans such as “death to the dictator.” In some slogans in favour of  the former Shah regime and the Pahlavi family. None of this, by itself, would be unprecedented.

However, what differs the protest wave from previous protest is that, not only Iranians who are opposing to the regime but also pro-regime social circles are affected in negative way. The strike in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar known as the historical and economic heart of the country proves that. As a matter of fact, The Bazaar is not simply a marketplace; it is a central node of Iran’s commercial and financial life. And it also represent traditional and conservative side of Iran which traditionally supports the Islamic regime. In this sense, a strike in The Grand Bazaar is not only significant but also a parameter to assess strength of the regime. Closing of the Bazaar also signals that unrest has reached into the regimes’ economic elite.

Shortly afterward, President Masoud Pazashkiyan announced on X (formerly Twitter) that, he “accepted” resignation of the Governor of Iran’s Central Bank. While it is interesting to that such announcement made on X which is officially banned in Iran. It is also noteworthy so say that in the system like Iran’s, such resignation is less a voluntary exit than a political dismissal. The message was clear: pressure from below had reached the upper layers of the state.

The Kurdish Factor and Regime Sensitivities

A second, often overlooked, element is Kurdish factor in Iran. While the protests are nationwide, the majority of the protests are taking place in Western Iran aka Rojhelat in Kurdish where is Kurdish majority. That statistics do matters as the Kurds are the second largest ethnic groups in Iran, numbering around 20 million people. Beyond their demographic and quantitative weight, Kurdish regions have long been among the state’s most sensitive areas back to even pre-Islamic regime era. Kurdish movements in Iran have a history of armed resistance, experience in guerrilla warfare and cross-border ties with Kurds in other countries. It is not secret that Kurds are asking their fundamental rights back. Furthermore, inspiring by the fact that their cousins in Syria, Iraq and Turkey have gained their freedom and rights through armed struggles, a potential for Iranian Kurds to revolt against the Iranian regime has always been existing.

According to the open-source and social media reports from the Kurdish city of Îlam, protesters took control of the city, with security forces either withdrawing or laying down their arms. Government buildings were reportedly entered and seized by demonstrators.
 

To note that, these claims remain unverified and unconfirmed and should be treated cautiously. However, even they are social media-exaggerations, they give hint that how regime’s response has been softer and less-violent in Iranian standards- comparing to previous years’ protests.

Redesigning in Post- 12 Days War

Despite being nationwide, compared to previous protest waves, the current demonstrations are relatively limited in scale and intensity. This stands in sharp contrast to 2009 protest, when police, IRGC and the military seized control of the streets and cities, killing protesters by sniper-shoots and arresting thousands. Likewise, to compare with Mahsa Amini protests following her murder because “didn’t cover her hair properly” which saw armed clashes in most of the provinces. 

Aftermath the  12 Day War with Israel, Iran is in process of re-design its regime and state institutions in various aspects, such as economically, militarily and socially.

Economically, the international sanctions continue to bite. In addition to hardship in the economy, the country passed through severe summer drought damaged agriculture and industry. Additionally, global oil prices is decreasing. Since Iran’s biggest income and revenue source are oil and gas, this is a significant threat to Iranian economy.

Military wise, Iran has lost of its proxies in Middle East aftermath series of conflict in post- October 7th. Since Iran has not proxy to rely on anymore, Tehran is redesigning its military doctrine from an offensive order to a defensive position- which we call “from octopus to turtle doctrine”. In that sense, Iran has expressed its interest in acquiring J-10 fighters from China and Pakistan. Also it is confirmed that Iran has received over thirty Su-35s from Russia. And unconfirmed reports suggest, Chinese made air-defence-systems (ADS) were mounted in western Iran. This sort of deep military doctrine change, from regional projection to homeland defense, doesn’t happen in an overnight. In paralel with military doctrine, Iran is changing its intelligence methods. The open-source suggest frequent arrest of “foreing agents” work for Israel and executing them. 

Social and daily life stages bigger changes. Videos circulating on social media that Iranian women openly ignoring mandatory hijab laws in public areas. The posts also show rising a rapid and surprising discourse of identity of “Iranism” rather than Islamic and Shiite identity, followed by inauguration of ancient Persian Empire figures’ statues in various spots. Although the law remains there, enforcement has apparently softened. The same logic can be seen against protestors. Such change on enforcing law and softer responses to the protesters should not mislead; the regime still retains the capacity for oppressing, jailing and using violence, yet it hesitates to use it. It also does worth to note that the regime still has a strong ground in certain parts of the society. However, what does restraint the regime to use its capacity is not ideological but it is strategic. Iranian regime apparently fears that a harsh crackdown on protesters will strengthen the protest, as it has repeatedly in the past. Also using old-methods to crack down on protest will jeopardize its effort to change and re-design. 

Iran’s Glasnost and Perestroika

Whether described as reform, doctrinal-change or tactical retreat, Iran’s current approach strongly resembles the late Soviet period. Under Gorbachev administration, the Soviet Union proposed two reforms programs; Glasnost and Perestroika. The reform programs were designed to refine the Soviet system by granting wider economic and social freedoms. However, unlike what the Soviet government expected, wider rights of freedom of speech, criticism, mobilization and economic, brought more protests and and criticism towards to the Soviets Union. Ultimately, Glasnost and Perestroika reforms didn’t work and the Soviet Union doesn’t exist today.

As of today, one can not predict that Iran’s collapse is imminent. As evidenced by the data, forecasting such outcomes would be irresponsible. What can be said, based on open sources, is that expectations for controlled reform should remain low.

While difficult to assess its possibility, Iran may likely need to pursue a dramatic change in its foreign policy; reducing tensions with the United States and Israel and somehow, convincing external actors that it no longer poses a regional threat. Signals in this direction, such as recent self-criticism by figures like former foreign minister Javad Zarif, may indicate an attempt to reset old narratives.

Ultimately, while Iran’s current protests are not strongest in the history, it gives hints regarding the regime’s reflects and its possible future policies. The regime apparently still holds power, however, it doesn’t feel confident to use its power against the people. The regime is taking bold steps and compromises regarding long-standing controversial practices such as hijab law. However, its early to assess whether these policies will success or not.