Two Fronts, One Logic: Karabakh and Rojava

Parallels Between the Nagorno-Karabakh and Rojava Cases

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Following the Paris Agreement signed on January 6, 2026, Syrian Arab Army forces including former Free Syrian Army factions, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and non-Syrian militias effectively functioning as Turkey's proxies launched apparently well-planned military operations against Kurdish areas, known as Rojava. The attacks began in Aleppo's two Kurdish enclaves, Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiya, later expanding to other regions and ultimately to areas west of the Euphrates River. While official discourse frames these attacks as an effort to push the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from the west bank of the Euphrates, developments on the ground suggest the main goal is actually dismantling Kurdish self-administration and reversing the political, economic, and territorial gains achieved over the past decade.

The military tactics employed and the official discourse surrounding Rojava bear a striking resemblance to Armenia's 2020 Karabakh War and its trajectory. As may be recalled, after coming to power, Nikol Pashinyan departed from the traditional Armenian consensus on Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Turkey. His openness to peace negotiations that could end the military conflict with Azerbaijan including the possibility of a non-violent transfer of Karabakh to Azerbaijani control challenged long-standing red lines. Yet apparently, a peaceful resolution did not serve Ankara or Baku's strategic preferences. What began as a territorial dispute escalated into full-scale war, eventually threatening Armenia's internal territories, including areas surrounding Lake Sevan.

Given Turkey's historical patterns, it is fair to say that neither Ankara nor Jolani's perspective was ever really about whether territory lay west or east of the Euphrates. The strategic target has consistently been the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military organization, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The reasoning behind this strategic focus stems from Turkey's century-long Kurdish Question, which leads Ankara to target territory historically inhabited by Kurdish communities.

Under the Paris Agreement, the SDF had already agreed to withdraw east of the Euphrates. In practice, the SDF had initiated this process earlier, pulling out of Aleppo in April 2025 as a goodwill gesture toward de-escalation. As in the Karabakh case, however, withdrawal and peaceful gestures did not prevent war perhaps because peaceful resolutions would not serve the domestic politics of certain regional actors. The discourse of "defeating the Kurds on the battlefield" functions less as a military necessity than as a psychological and political tool, reinforcing domestic legitimacy and nationalist narratives.

Military Calculations and Diplomatic Constraints
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The SDF's relatively rapid and for some, unexpected withdrawal can be explained by a combination of military and diplomatic factors. With an estimated force of over 100,000 well-trained fighters, including both men and women, the SDF remains militarily stronger than the Syrian army, which largely consists of Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army units and jihadist elements, including Uyghur, Uzbek, and other foreign fighters. Despite this military superiority, the SDF has refrained from a broader conflict with Jolani's forces, as it could potentially trigger wider regional confrontations that would undermine the SDF's Arabo-Kurd peace-building project, known as the "Democratic Nation." Furthermore, such a conflict might provoke direct Turkish military intervention, which would decisively alter the balance of power.

Despite holding a quantitative advantage over Jolani's forces, the SDF's primary military goal remains preserving its manpower and territory as much as possible. A full confrontation with the Turkish army would severely damage its military capabilities and potentially lead to further territorial losses. One might recall the Kurds' successful guerrilla warfare against the Turkish army, which lasted over fifty years. However, in terms of manpower, technical capability, and air dominance, the SDF is far from posing a serious threat to Turkey's military.

Diplomatically, the context is even more restrictive. The ongoing peace process in Turkey between the PKK and the Turkish government is valued by both parties particularly for Kurds, for whom the process carries significant weight. However, this peace process is closely tied to developments in Syria and Rojava. A major war would have undermined the already fragile process, as well as the military and political achievements gained by Kurdish movements.

Furthermore, the involvement of outside figures such as Tom Barrack whose approach to the Syrian case favors the Turkish perspective and advocates for a centralized Syria, a model that has neither historically existed nor functioned in the country complicates matters further. From Turkey's perspective, the peace process appears to be a useful time-buying mechanism. While it halts PKK military activity, it also pacifies SDF reactions toward Turkish-backed Jolani forces in Syria.

Within this framework, the SDF had already made significant concessions. Under the March 10 Agreement initially proposed by Turkey, it withdrew from Aleppo and signaled openness to integration within the so-called Syrian army. Given the fragmented structure of that army, the SDF's effort to integrate can be seen as an act of altruism.

Beyond Territorial Losses: Collapse of Peace-building Project 
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By early 2026, the SDF had lost approximately 42 percent of the territory it once controlled. Its presence was pushed entirely east of the Euphrates, while most oil fields fell out of its control. Critical infrastructure including the Tishrin and Tabqa dams, essential for electricity and water supply also passed into the hands of Jolani's forces.

Beyond territorial losses, the most significant casualty may be the collapse of the Arabo-Kurd alliance and the peace-building process known as the "Democratic Nation," into which the Rojava administration and SDF had heavily invested. Ironically, however, the collapse of this project or the loss of Arab-populated areas could be seen as advantageous for the SDF and Rojava in some respects. The project had been successfully implemented and helped establish peace between Kurdish and Arab communities, while also increasing women's role in society. Yet despite its success and potential, it became a costly burden for the SDF, as Turkish intelligence found opportunities to orchestrate anti-SDF unrest within tribal structures.

Despite these setbacks, the core of the SDF particularly the Kurdish YPG and YPJ units, alongside a small percentage of allied Arab fighters remains largely intact and has avoided catastrophic casualties. This preservation of military capacity constitutes a limited but meaningful success, providing the SDF with room for diplomatic recalibration.

Nonetheless, beyond material losses, the broader project of constructing a decentralized and pluralistic political model in Syria has suffered a severe blow. Even so, the SDF appears committed to consolidating its remaining territory and maintaining institutional continuity by all available means.

Ironically, the attacks on Rojava have accelerated Kurdish political convergence and unity. Cooperation between the Rojava administration and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) has intensified to an unprecedented degree. This rapprochement may help resolve long-standing disputes, including the potential integration of Roj Peshmerga forces into the SDF. Moreover, KRG assistance could increase the Rojava administration's lobbying capacity in the US.

Although reduced in size, the remaining SDF-controlled territory is more demographically coherent and potentially easier to govern. Since the SDF's primary and most logical goal is preserving its military power, less tension can reasonably be expected going forward. If sustained through effective diplomacy and regional coordination, Rojava could, over time, assume a role comparable to Idlib after December 2024 a constrained but resilient political space shaped less by military dominance than by negotiated survival.