Nogorno-Karabagh's Fate in Rojava

After the Paris Agreement of 6 January 2026, the so-called Syrian Arab Army -acting as a proxy force for Turkey, carried out military attacks on Kurds which actually is an ethnic cleansing campaign against Kurdish communities, first in Aleppo and then West bank of the Euphrates. Official discourse presents these campaigns as an attempt to push the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) out of western Euphrates areas. On the ground, however, it is clear that the real purpose is to dismantle Kurdish self-administration altogether and erase the political, economical and territorial gains achieved over the past decade.

Anyone familiar with near history will notice strong parallels between today’s Syria and Armenia’s trajectory in recent years. After coming to power, Pashinyan, unlike previous Armenian leaders, posed unpopular opinions about Nogorno-Karabagh issue and relations with Turkey. A peaceful solution, even a non-violent handover of Karabakh to Azerbaijan has finally been possible. Nevertheless, a settlement without war was never in the interest of either Turkey or Azerbaijan. What began as a conflict over Karabakh soon expanded into a war that directly threatened Armenia’s borders even initial provinces like Lake Sevan.

A similar scenario is now unfolding in Rojava. For both Turkey and Jolani’s Syria, the issue has never been whether the fighting takes place west or east of the Euphrates. The real target has always been whole the northern Syria where is thousand years of Kurdish land. As per of Paris Agreement, which is not a secret anymore, Kurdish forces already agreed to withdraw to Eastern bank of the Euphrates. In fact, the SDF has already withdrew from Aleppo in April 2025 for showing a good-will for peaceful solutions. Yet a peaceful withdrawal, similarly case of Nogorno-Karabagh, was clearly of little value to Jolani, a former al-Qaeda figure, or to Ankara. The discourse of “defeating the Kurds on the battlefield” serves a clear purpose: it feeds a psychological warfare strategy and propaganda that helps popularity and power of “some leaders” in domestic political landscapes. 

The SDF’s earlier-than-expected and relatively smooth withdrawal can be explained through military and diplomatic realities. With over 100,000 well-trained fighters, the SDF poses stronger than the so-called Syrian Arap Army(SAA) which is consisting Turkish backed Free Syrian Army and Al-Qaeda elements such as Uyghur, Uzbek and other foreigner fighters. However, the possible Turkish military support to SAA would have fundamentally shift the balance of the war. In SDF’s perspective, a direct confrontation with the Turkish army, would cost more than losing territory. Preserving military capacity within its core areas therefore seems as the least destructive and most logical option available.

On the diplomatic perspective, the situation is even more tangled. The Peace Process currently under way in Turkey is heavily depending on developments in Syria and Rojava. A new war in Rojava would inevitably undermine the fragile political groundwork laid by Kurdish actors in Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Moreover, the presence of figures such as Tom Barrack whose record raises serious questions of diplomatic ethics and who openly promotes a centralized Syrian state that HAS NEVER EXISTED and WILL NEVER EXIST in Syria, confirms that this is not and ideal moment the SDF could realistically afford a great war.

In an effort to appease key actors on the ground, the SDF had already withdrawn from Aleppo under the framework of the 10 March Agreement - a process proposed by Turkey which today what it seems to be time-buying apparatus of Turkey. The SDF even signalled readiness to make concessions toward integration into the so-called Syrian Army. 

At present, the SDF appears to have lost roughly 42 percent of the territory it once controlled. Its area of control has been pushed entirely east of the Euphrates, while most oil fields have been lost. Strategic infrastructure including the Tishrin and Tabqa dams, vital for electricity and water   has also fallen into the hands of the so-called Syrian Army.

However, it does worth to mention that the backbone of the SDF the Kurdish YPG forces, along with its Arab fighters, are remaining with minimal casualties. That can be counted as a successs for the SDF and it is fair to say that it gives the SDF and Kurds rooms to make diplomatic manoeuvres. In addition to military, economic and territorial loses, the SDF’s project of building a new, democratic Syrian society has taken a heavy blow. Even so, the SDF appears determined to consolidate what remains and maintain its presence by any means necessary.

The attacks in Rojava actually brought different Kurdish parties together, stronger than ever. Stronger diplomatic ties and cooperation between the Rojava administration and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRG) is quite remarkable. This level of cooperation, potentially will solve some “glitches” between two parties; such as integration of Roj Peshmerga forces into the SDF. At the same time, despite losing strategic spots, the SDF will be governing a smaller and more demographically coherent area.

If the SDF manages to preserve its remaining areas through effective diplomacy, it would be possible to see Rojava play a role of Idlib in December 2024, over the coming years.