Why Turkey’s "Master Plan" for Syria Didn't Work

As many of you know, exactly one year ago today, the half-century-old Baathist regime was in the throes of collapse. Coincidentally, on the very day the regime fell, I was a guest on a friend’s channel to discuss Syria. During that broadcast, I predicted that the developments of December 2024 would escalate the conflict rather than bring it to a close. Unfortunately, these predictions came true.

In the 2020 Tunisian elections, Ennahda, the party linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunsia, gained a significant votes that its "legendary" leader Rached Ghannouchi took the role of Speaker of Parliament. Reminding, relationship between the Brotherhood and Turkey which is an open secret. Ghannouchi’s first visit, with the airs of a head of state, was to Turkey. This move ultimately precipitated the purge of both Ghannouchi and Ennahda. Turkey’s proxy operation, conducted with such haste and in such a brazenly visible manner, ultimately fell victim to its own impatience.

We cite the Tunisian example because, following the fall of the Baath regime in Syria in December 2024, Turkey has acted with a similar reckless heavy-handedness. This approach relies on a fait accompli strategy to establish a military base. For anyone with even a elementary understanding of the Middle East and international relations, it is clear that such efforts are unrealistic. What we are seeing to day is that the plans of establishing a major military base near Damascus immediately after the regime's fall, have already collapsed. This failure has echoed  beyond Syria; the prospect of deploying Turkish troops to Gaza now seems equally improbable. Aside from the logistical likelihood of Turkish forces settling in Gaza, Turkey’s eagerness for anti-Israel military action in Syria has, in all probability, further diminished the chances of any deployment to Gaza.

Another strategic blunder is clarifying the Kurds as "hostiles." Choosing the Jolani administration-which suffers from severe issues regarding international recognition and image-over the Rojava administration, which holds a cleaner record and is often touted as a "thousand-year brother," does not appear to be a viable strategy. While one might understand Turkey labeling Rojava as an adversary due to its ties with the PKK, the rhetoric emerging from the Turkish side has been so aggressive that it effectively usurped the role of the new Syrian administration. While viewing the Jolani leadership as an ally is understandable to a point, demanding Kurdish disarmament with an ambition than Jolani himself is entirely unrealistic. Furthermore, this rhetoric, which borders on outright hostility toward the Kurds and is reminiscent of the language used during ISIS's assault on Kobani, poses a threat to domestic peace within Turkey as well.

In conclusion, it was no surprise that Turkey wished to utilize Syria as a proxy. However, the belief that it could establish a military base on Israel's doorstep in a matter of days appears to be a severe miscalculation. It is no exaggeration to say that this premature maneuver has resulted in the loss of the Golan Heights and the emergence of a de facto Druze administration just a few dozen kilometers from Damascus.

On the other hand, placing all eggs in the Jolani basket while alienating the Kurds has undermined peace in both Syria and Turkey. Establishing friendly relations with the Rojava administration-which has maintained a disciplined and modern stance-rather than a figure with a tarnished record like Jolani, would have been the most cost-effective and peaceful path for Turkey. Instead, the fear of potential Israel-Kurdish cooperation drove Turkey toward another miscalculation: the belief that these spheres of influence could be rolled back through military force alone. However, the dynamics on the ground do not allow Turkey unfettered use of military power. Moreover, the move to threaten the Kurds in order to block Kurdish-Israeli relations carries the potential to backfire, much like the failed attempt to establish a base in Damascus.